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NOTES
Brady48 the Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not embody "an inexorable command that no trial for any offense or
in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is
not represented by counsel." Under the rule of that decision due process is
afforded to the defendant without supplying counsel for his defense when, in
view of all the surrounding circumstances, the denial of counsel does not
seriously prejudice his right to a fair hearing.49 If a case should arise in
which the state has fully complied with the federal standard as enunciated in
the Betts case, yet has failed to comply with its own more rigorous standard,
such a situation would provide an appropriate occasion to invoke the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
The previous extension of the clause to the analogous fact situation in the Cook case should
prove to be a persuasive factor in inducing the courts to take this step.
The application of the equal protection clause to defects occurring prior
to conviction, as in the right to counsel situation, would presumably not be
rendered impotent by restrictions on the remedy available in the federal
courts, since there can be no serious objection to invalidating a conviction
secured by denying equality of treatment.

THE GERRYMANDER AND JUDICIAL ABSTENTION-AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND THE DISCRETIONARY POWER TO
DENY EQUITABLE RELIEF
The right to effective participation in the selection of public officials is
fundamental to a truly democratic system.' Historically, however, various
political groups in the United States have succeeded in denying this right to
certain elements of the population. This end has been attained chiefly
48. 316 U.S. 455 (1941).
49. Id. at 473.

50. Todd v. State, 226 Ind. 496, 81 N.E.2d 530 (1948), is just such a case according to
the dissenting judges.
784 (1948).

See the dissenting opinions at 82 N.E.2d (1948)

and 81 N.E.2d

1. While this right is the foundation of our constitutional system it is qualified in
certain respects. The states have the right to define who shall participate by the exercise
of the franchise, U.S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 2, but their definition of the electorate must be
in compliance with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). Thus, as stated in Wiley v. Sinlder,
179 U.S. 58, 62 (1900), "The right to vote for members of the Congress of the United
States is not derived merely from the Constitution and laws of the State in which they
are chosen, but has its foundation in the Constitution of the United States." And when
the class who may vote has been defined by the state the members of the class must be
treated equally in their exercise of the right. Smith v. Allwright, supra. Generally, see
Note, Negro Disenfranchisement-A Challenge to the Constitution, 47 CoL. L. Rav. 76
(1947).
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through disproportionate geographical distribution of voting strength,- which
results in just as effective a denial of the ballot as would direct disenfranchisement. And at present there seems to be no remedy for those whose political
rights are so obstructed.
The most obvious examples of geographical disparity have resulted from
the population shift to urban areas. Any redistribufion of political strength by
equalizing representation in the legislature in conformance with the population
shift would divest the rural elements of considerable political power. And
for the most part this group has successfully thwarted attempts in the state
and federal legislatures to alleviate the resulting disparity. Failure by the
proponents of change to procure legislative action has precipitated a number
of attempts to obtain relief in the courts on constitutional grounds.4 The
courts, however, while refusing to find strict compliance with the spirit of
the Fourteenth Amendment, frequently have sustained the constitutionality
of statutes involving the geographical distribution of political strength within
a state.5 But even when the discrimination is admitted the courts usually have
2. Knowing the political predilictions of each locality, the dominant element may so
tailor the districts that adverse votes will constitute ineffective minorities throughout
the state or minimize the loss by concentrating unfriendly voters in a few sacrificial districts. The sacrificial district is drawn to include a much greater total population than
"safe" districts. This method has been most widely used in congressional districting, with
the result that in 26 states the largest district has from 150% to 88% more inhabitants than
the smallest. Note, Constitutional Right to CongressionalDistricts of Equal Population,
56 YALE L.J. 127 (1946). See also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 557-563 (1945) ;
Holm v. Smiley, 184 Minn. 228, 238 N.W. 494 (1931), re%'d, 285 U.S. 355 (1932);
GRIFFITH, RISE AND DEVELOP.MENT OF THE GERRYMANDER (1907); ScHMECEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 149-192 (1941).
3. Of the 31 states whose constitutions order periodic redistricting, only 14 have acted
within the designated period and in six states no reapportionment has been made in 45
years. FARMER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN ALABAMA: LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT

4 (1944) ; Durfee, Apportionment of Representation in the Legislature: A Study of State
Constitutions,43 MIcH. L. REV. 1091, 1104 (1945) ; Walter, Reapportionment of Districts,
37 ILL. L. REV. 20, 38 (1942). In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1945), complaint
was made of an apportionment statute passed in 1901.
4. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) ; Mac Dougal v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948);
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1945); Mahen v. Hume, 287 U.S. 575 (1932); Cook
v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1946), aff'd inein., 329 U.S. 675 (1946) ; Turman v.
Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga. 1946), aff'd mem., 329 U.S. 675 (1946). But cf.
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). Contra: Gates v. Long, 172 Tenn. 471, 113 S.W.2d
388 (1938).
5. Illustrative of this is Mac Dougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), where the court
stated:

"It is clear that the requirement'of two hundred signatures from at least fifty

counties gives to the voters of the less populous counties of Illinois the power completely
to block the nomination of candidates whose support is confined to geographically limited
areas. But the State is entitled to deem this power not disproportionate. . . . It would
be strange indeed, and doctrinaire for this Court, applying such broad constitutional con-

cepts as due process and equal protection of the laws, to deny a State the power to assure
a proper diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those
having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical opportunities
for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the former." Accord:
Grahame v. Special Comm'rs, 306 Mass. 237, 27 N.E.2d 995 (1940) ; Stenson v. Secretary
of State, 308 Mich. 48, 13 N.W.2d 202 (1940) (apportionment of seats in state legisla-
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refused to intervene.' Two concepts of judicial limitation, one found in the
Constitution-the theory of political questions; and the other self-imposedthe discretion to deny equitable relief, have been utilized to sustain this result.
Either or both of these concepts may justify judicial abstention in a
proper case, but that is not to say that they may be used interchangeably, for
they are similar only in the most superficial respects. By intermixing the two
concepts, the most recent decision denying relief where a political distribution
statute was challenged threatens to characterize the entire problem as a purely
constitutional one. 7 The danger inherent in the confusion is clear: the relatively slim chance that a court may intervene to upset such a statutory system
would disappear and with it any check on unfair distribution. In South v.
Peters,8 the United States Supreme Court refused to enjoin operation of the
Georgia primary system, similar in its operation to the presidential electoral
college,0 with the categorical statement that "[f]ederal courts consistently
ture) ; O'Rourk v. Cohen, 265 N.Y. 318, 192 N.E. 833 (1934)

(distribution of signatures

on petition for independent nomination); State ex rel. Plimmer v. Poston, 58 Ohio St.
620, 51 N.E. 150 (1898) (requirement that a political party poll at least 1% of the total
vote cast at the preceding election). But cf. People ex rel. Hotchkiss v. Smith, 206 N.Y.
231, 99 N.E. 568 (1912) (requirement that 1500 signatures be on petition when only 800
voters were in the district in which petitioner was to be elected) ; Gates v. Long, 172
Tenn. 471, 113 S.W.2d 388 (1938)

(county unit vote in primary based on number of

votes cast in preceding primary).
6. This is illustrated by the numerous unsuccessful attempts by Illinois' voters to
obtain relief from that state's inequitable congressional apportionment system culminating
in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1945) (injunction refused). Fergus v. Marks, 321
Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926) (judiciary will not mandate the legislature to reapportion) ;
Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928) (refusal to restrain state auditor from
expending funds for the holding of an election under the allegedly unconstitutional
statute) ; Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930) (quo warranto against
state senators unsuccessful) ; Daly v. Madison County, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d 160 (1942)
(holding the even more inequitable 1901 Illinois statute, revived by the decision in Moran
v. Bowely, infra, to be unassailable). But cf. Moran v. Bowley, 347 Ill. 148, 179 N.E.
526 (1932) (relief granted because the state statute did not comply with the Congressional apportionment statute of 1911 and the state constitution).
7. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), 49 MicH. L. Rxv. 271 (1950), 26 NoTRE
DAmE LAW.

122 (1950), 24 TEmP. L.Q. 239 (1950), 36 VA. L. REV. 678 (1950).

8. Ibid.
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-3212 (1936). The counties stand in a position analogous to
the states. Each county is allotted twice the number of unit votes as that county has
representatives in the most numerous branch of the state legislature. The eight most
populous counties have six unit votes each; the thirty next most populous, four unit votes;
and the remaining 121 counties, two unit votes. The candidates receiving a plurality of
the popular vote in a county wins that county's entire unit vote. The chairman of the
state executive committee then consolidates the unit votes and the candidate receiving a
majority of all the county unit votes is declared to be the candidate in the general election.
The system is mandatory in primaries to determine candidates for United States Senator,
Governor, State House Officers, and State Supreme Court Justices. See note 25 infra.
Plaintiffs in South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), were resident voters of Fulton
County, the state's most populous county, and alleged that the statute denies equal protection of the laws by preventing them from casting an effective ballot. The combined
population of the 67 smallest counties is less than the population of Fulton county, but
their combined unit vote is 134 to Fulton's six. The 206 unit votes necessary to win the
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refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political issues arising
from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its
political subdivisions.""
The courts' refusal to decide political questions is based on the constitutional separation of powers between the three departments of government. The
term was first used to justify judicial abstention in disputes affecting this
country's foreign relations. Since the Constitution expressly delegates the
power to deal with other sovereignties to the legislative and executive departments," the courts have not intervened where a decision by them might
conflict with a decision within the prerogative of those political departments.12 The constitutional provisions which guarantee the states protection
against internal strife and assure them a republican form of government
are also held to depend for their enforcement exclusively upon the political
candidacy can be obtained from counties having only 26% of the state's population. The
greatest single discrepancy pointed out was that one popular vote in Echols County is equal
in effect to 122 Fulton County votes. Brief for Appellants, pp. 7-9, South v. Peters, supra.
The same statute was unsuccessfully attacked in Cook v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624 (N.D.
Ga. 1946), aff'd vnein., 329 U.S. 675 (1946), and Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744
(N.D. Ga. 1946), aff'd inem., 329 U.S. 675 (1946), 47 COL. L. Rav. 284 (1947).
10. This was the only sentence in the per curiam opinion going to a "holding." The
cases cited in support of the statement were: Mac Dougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) ;
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) ; Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932) ; cf. Johnson v. Stevenson, 170 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1948).
Justices Douglas and Black dissented, stating that the right to vote and to have that
vote equally counted is constitutionally protected; the democratic primary is the true election of Georgia and this primary system plainly discriminated against city residents, the
predominantly urban negro population of Georgia and the urban laboring class. They distinguished the decision in Colegrove v. Green, supra, as based on a "political question"
not presented in this case.
11. U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 2. "He [the President] shall have power, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur . .

.

and . . . shall appoint ambassadors

..

"

§

3

"...

he

shall

receive ambassadors and other public ministers. ..."
12. The main consideration is that while there can be a difference of opinion as to
what should be done in foreign relations, yet there must be unity of decision. Other
nations could justifiably refuse to deal with negotiators whose decisions could be overthrown by a judicial tribunal. The fear of retaliation by a foreign nation because of an
adverse ruling by an American court also militates against the courts dealing with these
questions. Issues held to be "political questions" are, e.g., the status of a diplomatic
representative, In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890) ; Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884) ;
determination of the valid government of a foreign nation, United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942) ; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) ; Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890) ; commencement or termination of war, Woods v. Miller, 333
U.S. 138 (1948) ; United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56 (U.S. 1870) ; interpretation of
rights under a treaty, Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U.S. 1829) ; but if the treaty confers
rights upon private parties the rights conferred may be determined by the courts, De
Feoffery v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890). Dealings with the Indian tribes are also held to
be exclusively within the province of the political departments, United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913); The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (U.S. 1866); United States v.
Hallidy, 3 Wall. 407 (U.S. 1866).
On the general subject see POST, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS
(1936) ; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L.
REv. 485 (1924).

NOTES
departments."3 These provisions do not expressly exclude the judiciary, but
the possible conflict between judicial and political decision would lead to confusion and would undermine the separation of powers envisaged by the framers
of the Constitution. 4 Thus, refusal to determine a political question involves
judicial self-limitation in only a limited sense, for the Constitution is considered to give the court no other choice."'
The discretionary power of a court to grant equitable relief, however, is
much less restrictive in that it is truly self imposed. This concept of selflimitation has no foundation in political theory. It is rooted in practical consideration of the limitations of judicial remedies.'" It calls for a factual analy-

13. U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § 4. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U.S. 1849). To decide
the case the Court would have had to decide which of two competing groups was the valid
government of Rhode Island. And since the President had sent military assistance to the
government under which defendant claimed, the Court felt bound by that decision. The
question has arisen in numerous cases since that time, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron
Park District, 281 U.S. 74 (1930), (challenging state constitutional provision requiring a
concurrence of all but one of the supreme court justices in order to overthrow a state
statute) ; Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) ; Pacific State's Tel. &
Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (initiative and referendum provisions of the state
constitution questioned) ; Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 244 (1915) (contested
election, plaintiff claiming a decision in favor of defendants will deny a republican form
of government) ; Hile v. City of Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 144, 141 N.E. 35 (1923) (attack
upon the city manager plan of municipal government).
14. Writers have consistently said that the term "political question" defies definition.
In this regard compare the views of Maurice Finkelstien, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37
HARV. L. REv. 338 (1923), with M.F. Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARv. L. REV. 296
(1924) (written in answer to the article by Finkelstien, supra), and Oliver P. Field,
The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv. 485 (1924).
15. Finkelstien,supra note 14, takes the position that in certain instances the courts
"will shy off and throw the burden of decision on other shoulders" calling it a "political
question" because of the adverse effects of deciding the case before the court. That
would be self-limitation in its broadest sense. A better, and more restricted view, is that
of Weston and Field, supra note 14, who state that the Constitution impliedly dictates the
court's abstention from decision of not only the case in which the question first arose but
any case in which it is pled, for example, that the state is denied a republican form of
government. See cases cited in note 13 supra.
16. Historically, equity has no jurisdiction to enforce a political right because it does
not constitute a property right. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1902) ; Mills v. Green, 69
F. 852 (4th Cir. 1895) ; Chandler v. Neff, 298 F. 515 (W.D. Tex. 1924). Some recent
cases have distinguished political rights, which refer only to the right to participate in one's
government (e.g., the right to hold office or to vote) and civil rights which all persons
possess (e.g., owning property or to marry) and have enforced only the latter. Johnson
v. Stevenson, 170 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1948) ; Caven v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 295 (W.D. Ark.
1948) ; Blackman v. Stone, 17 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. I1. 1936) ; Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co. v.
Village of Kinney, 262 F. 980 (D.C. Minn. 1919). The primary consideration seems to
be that to enjoin an election would disenfranchise the entire populous in order to enforce
the rights of the single individual before the court. See also 4 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURsPRUDENrCE §§ 1753-1755 (4th ed. 1919). Because of this historical background there has
been great confusion in the terminology and consequently in the application of the two
doctrines sought to be distinguished in this note. See Mr. Justice Brandies, dissenting,
in Truax v. Gordon, 257 U.S. 312, 374 (1921). See also Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488
(1902) ; State v. Albritton, 251 Ala. 422, 37 So.2d 640 (1948) ; State ex rel. Tucker, 236
Ala. 284, 181 So. 761 (1938). But cf. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927), involving a damage action for deprivation of voting rights, where Mr. Justice Holmes stated that,
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sis in each case to determine whether the relief sought will put an end to the
alleged evil and whether the court can administer and enforce its decree.' For
example, to protect political rights by enjoining an election that promises to
be unfair might leave a state with no election at all or necessitate judicial
supervision of a state's electoral procedure. Either alternative may be
more undesirable than the unfair system sought to be enjoined.
When the court is dealing with a dilution of political rights arising from
disproportionate distribution of political strength the case may involve both
concepts. In Colegrove v. Green,'" plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to invalidate the Illinois congiessional apportionment statute as violative of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 Denial of relief was
probably justified under either theory."
Invalidation of the statute would
have left Illinois undistricted, contrary to a congressional decision that repre2
sentatives shall be elected from geographical districts defined by the state.. '
Thus the Court was presented with a political question because this decision
was within Congress' constitutional prerogative. 2
A second and distinct
"The objection that the subject matter of the suit is political is little more than a play
on words." It seems clear today that in a proper case equity will exercise its powers to
enforce political rights if a decree can be formed which is capable of enforcement and
which would not have adverse effects upon the holding of an election. Davis v. Schnell,
81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), af'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (injunction granted under
facts similar to Giles v. Harris, supra) ; Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
17. Mac Dougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 285 (1948) (concurring opinion) ; Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566 (1945) (concurring opinion) ; Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,
329 (1943); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943); Harrisonville v.
Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-340 (1932) ; 1 POiiEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE §§
67, 109, 111 (5th ed., Symons, 1941).
18. 328 U.S. 549 (1945).
19. The complaint was based upon the great disparity inpopulation between the plaintiffs' congressional district and those having much smaller populations, but equal representation. The plaintiffs were resident voters of Cook County, Ill., which contains the city
of Chicago. See notes 2, 3 and 6 supra.
20. The three judge majority opinion predicated the denial on the three grounds that
Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932), controlled; congressional apportionment is a political
question; and that equity could not afford relief. Mr. Justice Rutledge cast the deciding
ballot, but would deny relief on the equity rationale alone, without reaching any constitutional question. Three justices dissented stating that the discrimination was obvious and
relief should have been granted.
21. 46 STAT. 21 (1929), 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1941) passed pursuant to U.S. CoNsT. ART.
1, § 2 which provides that "Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several
states . . . according to their respective Numbers, . . ." and ART. I, § 4, "The times,

Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulation, ..."
22. "The short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive
authority to secure fair representation by the States in the popular House. . . . Whether
Congress faithfully discharges its duty or not has been committed to the exclusive control
of Congress." Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1945). In a concurring opinion
Mr. Justice Rutledge states that the case of Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1931), riles
squarely to the contrary. However, if it be accepted that a "political question" is to be
left for the political departments to decide, or if such decision has been made by them the
courts are bound, Smiley v. Holm is not in opposition. The court in that case did not
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ground for denial was that the serious consequences of disrupting the pending
election precluded equitable relief.2 3
The Colegrove decision should not.be construed to hold that disproportionate distribution of political strength is irremediable, but rather that considerations peculiar to that case rendered judicial intervention inappropriate.
A sharp distinction must be made between political questions and perfectly
justiciable questions involving political rights. Assuming that it is proper to
deny judicial relief in all cases of political questions, this is by no means true
of all cases where political rights are sought to be enforced by equitable
remedies. 24 The determination of the question of granting or withholding relief in the latter class of cases should turn on the practical considerations already mentioned. And where relief is denied the basis for denial should be
clearly indicated. Then in subsequent cases involving only the doctrine of
equitable discretion relief can be granted by factually distinguishing the
former cases. Treating the geographical distribution problem in this manner
would retain at least a minimum obstacle to- the would be disenfranchiser. 25
Unlike Colegrove v. Green, the political question of congressional apportionment was not present in South v. Peters.8 (Indeed, the Court's cursory
denial of relief is paradoxical, for while state legislation regulating the right
overthrow the state's congressional apportionment because it was inequitable, but for the
reason that the apportionment was not done according to the congressional mandate that
the states shall, by law, reapportion. 46 STAT. 21 (1929), 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1941).
23. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551 (1945).
24. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872
(S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
25. While the county unit system in Georgia was probably adopted with no discriminatory intent toward the urban group as a whole, or the now predominantly urbdn negro
population of Georgia, yet due to the change in circumstances since its adoption in 1917 it
now serves to perpetuate the political futility of those groups. It was not until Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1926), that it was definitely established that the primary constituted a state election in which negroes had the right to vote. See note 1 supra; KEY,
SOUTHERN POLITICS 117-129 (1949); HOLLAND, THE DIREcT PRIMtARY IN GEORGIA 44

(1949); The New South, May-June 1949, Vol. 4, Nos. 5 and 6, p. 7; A Long Dark Night
'for Georgia?, Harpers Magazine, Sept. 1948, Vol. 197, No. 1180, p. 55; Note, Georgia
County Unit Vote, 47 COL. L. REv. 284 (1947).
26. The only analogy to be drawn between the two cases is that they both involved
distribution of political strength. Because effective representation in Congress can only
be assured by Congress, does not mean that every time political strength is distributed it
carries with it a political question. See Mac Dougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948). The
South case involves only the individual right to cast a ballot, not the right to effective
representation. A conceivable result of the clash with the plenary power of Congress over
congressional apportionment was that the House might reject a delegation from Illinois
elected at large. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553 (1945). No such clash would be
possible if the Georgia County Unit system were to be overthrown. It has nothing to do
with congressional apportionment. See note 9 supra. The danger that the "political issue"
in South v. Peters may be construed to be a political question is apparent from the treatment of the case in the law reviews, 49 MIcH. L. Ray. 271 (1950) ; 26 NOTRE DAMtE LAW.
122 (1950); 24 TEip. L.Q. 239 (1950); 36 VA. L. REv. 678 (1950). There was no
political question, as here defined, involved in South v. Peters.
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to vote is otherwise limited by the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 this decision
would seem to render statutes concerning geographical distribution of political strength outside the pale of judicial censure.2")
The only issue was
whether injunctive relief was practicable and wise. A decree enjoining
the operation of the county unit system would have impinged upon Georgia's
elective process only after all ballots had been cast; it would have required
that equal weight be given to each ballot. The popular vote would then
have determined the outcome of the election. No embarrassment or difficulty of enforcement is apparent. Since relief might well have been proper,
the Court should have justified their denial by analysis of the facts.

LANDOWNER'S LIABILITY FOR INFANT DROWNING IN
ARTIFICIAL POND
Since its introduction some seventy years ago, the proposition that a
landowner may be liable to trespassing children who are injured by dangerous
artificial conditions on the land, under circumstances where an adult could not
recover, has had an interesting history. A recent Indiana Supreme Court decision on one of the specific applications of this "attractive nuisance" doctrinethe liability for the drowning of a child trespasser in an artificial body of
water-was Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana.' The complaint for
wrongful death alleged that the defendant left unguarded on its land an artificial pond in view of the street in a residential section of Hammond, Indiana.
Although the bottom was littered with debris and broken by abrupt drop-of fs
which were invisible through the murky water, the defendant took no steps to
warn the large groups of children known to be attracted there frequently to
27. See note 1 supra.
28. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938), it was
pointed out that the presumption of validity may have a narrower scope in regard to
statutes regulating non-economic rights embraced within the first ten amendments and
the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). Mac
Dougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) would seem to give this presumption a broader
scope where the regulation of non-economic rights embodies the principle that government
is not purely a matter of majority rule. See note 5 supra. This is understandable and
defensible because that principle is embodied in the Federal Constitution, which awards
each state equal representation in the Senate regardless of population. U.S. CONST.
AMEND. XVIII, § 1; ART. I, §§ 2, 3. However, the analogy is incomplete when it is
applied to political subdivisions within the state, because it presupposes the relation between county and state to be similar to that between state and federal government. See
note 9 supra. It forgets that the Federal Constitution was created to perfect a union of
thirteen separate, distinct, and independent sovereignties while the Georgia counties are
mere divisions for the more efficient operation of a single state government. GA. CoNsT.
ART. XI, § 1. South v..Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), goes to an extreme in that it does not
give effect to the policy of Mac Dougall v. Green, supra, nor does it pass upon the constitutionality of the statute in question, but renders it unassailable regardless of its
constitutionality.
1. 92 N.E.2d 632 (Ind. 1950) ; petition for rehearing denied, Oct. 4, 1950.

